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Torts-CONTRACTOR LIABILITY-CONTRACTOR HELD LIABLE TO RE-
MOTE PURCHASER FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO LATENT
DEFECTS IN CONSTRUCTION-Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
Billy Owens is a general contractor in Tallahassee, Florida. In
1971, Owens constructed and sold a house to Snead. Three years
later, Snead sold the house to Stanley and Jane Simmons. After
occupying the house for approximately three years, the Simmonses
filed a complaint against Owens alleging that he had negligently
constructed the house in violation of the City of Tallahassee Build-
ing Code.' On an exterior portion of the house less than six inches
of clearance existed between the wood siding and the ground. As
an alleged latent defect which was neither readily discernable, nor
reasonably discoverable by inspection, the flaw was not discovered
by Snead or the Simmonses.2
The Simmonses sought damages, alleging that Owens' negligence
was the proximate cause of the house being damaged by water rot
and termite infestation. Owens moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. The trial court granted the mo-
tion on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege facts dis-
closing a dangerous condition or an unreasonable risk to third per-
sons.3 The Simmonses appealed and the First District Court of
Appeal reversed. The issue in Simmons v. Owens was whether a
remote purchaser of a house may recover in tort for property dam-
ages resulting from the negligence of a building contractor." Hold-
ing for the appellant, the court recognized that a cause of action
exists against the building contractor where remote purchasers sus-
tain property damage -attributable to latent defects in construc-
tion. 5 The purpose of this note is to examine the rule of contractor
liability in Florida as it has developed over the years and to con-
sider a possible alternative to the rule as it presently exists.
In Florida, the traditional rule is that a contractor is not liable
for injuries to third parties occurring after the contractor has com-
pleted the work and turned it over to the owner.' This rule, how-
l. TALLAHASSEE, FLA., CODE § 9-11 (1957). This section adopts Chapters II through
XXIX of the Standard Building Code of 1976. STANDARD BUILDING CODE § 1702.7 (1976),
requires a minimum six-inch clearance between exterior wood siding and the earth.
2. Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
3. Id. at 143.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 143-44.
6. Carter v. Livesay Window Co., 73 So. 2d 411, 413 (Fla. 1954) (citing Ford v. Sturgis,
14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926)).
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ever, has been subjected to numerous exceptions. In Slavin v. Kay
the appellant, a motel guest, sustained injury when a sink basin
fell from the wall of his room and struck him. Consequently, the
appellant brought an action against the plumbing company who
had installed the sink. The appellant sought to impose liability on
the grounds that the plumbing company had been negligent in at-
taching the sink to the wall. Holding for the appellant, the Florida
Supreme Court noted two instances in which exceptions to the rule
of "nonliability after acceptance" had been recognized by the
court.8 The first exception arose in Breeding's Dania Drug Co. v.
Runyon, where an electrical contractor was held liable for negli-
gent wiring which resulted in electrical shock to a third person.'
This decision formulated the exception that all parties dealing
with inherently dangerous elements are held jointly liable without
regard to termination of the contract or acceptance of the work.10
The second exception was developed in Carter v. Livesay Window
Co.1" In that case, a four-year-old boy was killed when a precast
concrete window frame fell on him. The complaint alleged that the
contractor had negligently installed the window frame. That deci-
sion, predicated on The Restatement of Torts, extended liability to
building contractors who create inherently dangerous conditions.
To understand the basis of these exceptions, it is helpful to ex-
plore the principle behind the traditional rule. Basically, the ratio-
nale is that the contractor has no present duty to a third person if
the premises were in possession and in control of another at the
time of injury.'3 Furthermore, by accepting the defective work, the
owner imposes upon himself an immediate duty to correct the de-
fect. If he does not, then his own negligence becomes the proxi-
mate cause of the resulting injury.1 Following this logic, the Slavin
7. 108 So. 2d 462, rev'd in part on rehearing, 108 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1959).
8. Id. at 467.
9. 2 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1941).
10. Id. at 377.
11. 73 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1954).
12. Id. at 412-13. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 385 (1934) provides as follows:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others within or without the land
for bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or
condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor under the same rules
as those stated in §§ 394 to 398, 403 and 404 as determining the liability of one
who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of
others.
13. 108 So. 2d at 466.
14. Id.
CASE NOTES
court reasoned that the underlying principle did not apply where
there had been no acceptance by the owner or where the dangerous
condition was latent, i.e. not discoverable by reasonable inspec-
tion."' The court futher concluded that in the case of latent de-
fects, the contractor's original negligence remains as the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. 6
Over a decade later, the Third District Court of Appeal in
Calvera v. Green Springs, Inc. employed the Slavin rationale
where a nine-year-old girl was killed when a planter on the side of
a used house fell on her. 7 In a suit against the contractor, the
court held, based on the "dangerous condition" exception noted in
Slavin, that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action
for negligence. Utilizing this exception, the court extended liability
to the contractor, concluding that if the contractor failed to attach
or adequately support the planter that crushed the child, then he
created a condition of greater inherent danger than that created by
the contractor in Slavin.'8 As a further basis for extension of liabil-
ity, the Calvera court cited the Florida Constitution which stated:
''every person for any injury done him . . . shall have remedy
,,19
A fact situation similar to Calvera appeared before the Third
District Court of Appeal in Hutchings v. Harry.0 In that case, a
minor was injured when she ran into a sliding glass door that broke
and fell on her. She was a guest in the home at the time of the
injury. The child's mother, on behalf of her daughter, sued the
contractor alleging that he had negligently failed to install sliding
glass doors properly marked by decals and constructed of "break-
away" glass. The court held that no negligence could be found,
and, therefore, that no cause of action existed against the contrac-
tor. 1 In support of this conclusion, the Hutchings court, citing
Slavin and Calvera, determined that in order to extend the liabil-
ity of a contractor to third parties, it is necessary that the alleged
facts show: "(1) a dangerous latent defect for which the contractor
is responsible and (2) negligence of the contractor in failing to dis-
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 220 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
18. Id. at 416.
19. Id. The Calvera court cited FLA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1967, amended 1968) (current
version at FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
20. 242 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
21. Id. at 155-156.
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cover and remedy the latent defect."2 The court found that
neither of these requirements had been satisfied according to the
alleged facts.23
The differing requirements for liability set by the preceding de-
cisions tended to confuse the traditional rule. Forte Towers South,
Inc. v. Hill York Sales Corp. was no exception to this trend.24 In
that case, Hill York Sales Corporation contracted to design and
install an air conditioning system in Forte Towers South Apart-
ments. Several years after installation, water lines to individual
apartments ruptured causing damage to carpets, floors, and fur-
nishings. Examination revealed defects in the air conditioning sys-
tem which could not have been discovered by ordinary inspection.
Consequently, the district court found that these facts met the re-
quirements of the latent defect exception set down in Slavin.2' The
court failed, however, to comment on two distinguishing facts of
this case. First, the latent defect in Slavin was specifically quali-
fied by the court as a "dangerous condition. 2' The question raised
here, of course, is whether the air conditioning defects qualify as a
dangerous condition. Second, the damage occurring in Forte Tow-
ers was exclusively property damage, whereas all of the prior deci-
sions involved personal injury. Apparently, the Forte Towers ex-
ception to the traditional rule indicates the court's desire to
further extend contractor liability to include property damage.
Because it was in fact only an exception, and not a revised rule,
the Forte decision threw the general rule even more out of focus.
Consequently, the traditional rule, along with its numerous excep-
tions, survived to plague the court in Simmons v. Owens where it
was subjected to still further expansion.28
The Simmons decision merged the logic of Slavin with the prop-
erty damage exception of Forte Towers to establish a cause of ac-
tion against a contractor by remote purchasers of a used house for
property damages resulting from negligent construction. In so do-
ing, the court further distorted the traditional rule by introducing
a new requirement-unreasonable risk. The Simmons court deter-
mined that a contractor remains liable where "he creates a danger-
22. Id. at 155.
23. Id. at 155-56.
24. 312 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
25. Id. at 514.
26. 108 So. 2d at 465.
27. See 312 So. 2d at 514.
28. 363 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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ous condition of unreasonable risk which is latent . ",29 Having
laid this framework for the type of condition needed in order to
extend liability, the court relied on Forte Towers to justify the fur-
ther extension of liability to property damages.30 In support of this
decision, the court stated that there was no logical reason why the
rule of Forte Towers should not extend to subsequent purchasers
of the building.3 ' Furthermore, despite holding that the facts al-
leged in the complaint disclosed a latent dangerous condition or an
unreasonable risk,32 the Simmons court failed to explain how it
reached this determination.
This "patchwork" reasoning represents the growing difficulty in
applying the exception-riddled traditional rule. In fact, the Sim-
mons opinion relied heavily on realistic policy considerations
aimed at protecting the ordinary home purchaser who is not quali-
fied to determine when and where defects exist.3" The court recog-
nized that home purchasers are making the biggest and most im-
portant investments of their lifetimes. Purchasers cannot afford to
suddenly discover latent defects; the cost of repair may severely
burden family budgets.3 4 Moreover, the court employed firm lan-
guage emphasizing the need to depart from the traditional rule as
a means of determining contractor liability:
The careless work of contractors, who in the past have been insu-
lated from liability, must cease or they must accept financial re-
sponsibility for their negligence. In our judgment, building con-
tractors should be held to the general standard of reasonable care
for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably be endangered
by their negligence.38
Simmons is highly indicative of a trend toward equating contrac-
tor liability with manufacturer liability. In fact, the development
of building contractors' liability has closely paralleled that of the
products liability field. In the products liability area, the English
case of Winterbottom v. Wright introduced the requirement of
privity of contract between manufacturer and the party injured by
29. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citation omitted).
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a defective chattel.3 6 As a defense to negligence actions, the privity
rule soon trickled from products liability into contractor liability.37
Despite the erosion of the privity rule in both fields over the
years," it is still recognized to some degree in a few jurisdictions.3s
Basically, builders have been held liable to initial purchasers for
defects after acceptance of the work under two theories, implied
warranty and negligence. 40 Generally, however, remote purchasers
have been denied recovery." '
The decision by the New York Court of Appeals in the products
liability case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. established the
general principle that a plaintiff can sue in negligence regardless of
privity where he has shown that the defect in the product created
a dangerous condition.42 The traditional rule of contractor nonlia-
bility after acceptance of work was first modified when courts be-
gan applying the negligence doctrine established in MacPherson to
contractors who created inherently dangerous conditions.4
In the area of products liability, the MacPherson doctrine was
later extended to include actions for property damage, in addition
to the already established action for personal injury. Similarly,
the general trend in contractor liability is to implement a standard
of reasonable care and foreseeability as a yardstick for determining
contractor liability to third persons after the owner accepts the
work. In a Wisconsin case, Fisher v. Simon, the purchaser of a
36. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom, the driver of a mail coach was in-
jured when he was thrown from the vehicle which had collapsed due to its negligent state of
repair. The driver sued the defendant who had contracted with the post office to keep the
coach in good repair. The court held that since the defendant's duty under the contract
extended only to the post office, the driver lacked privity with the defendant, and, therefore,
could not recover in contract or tort. Id. at 406.
37. See, e.g., City of Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N.Y. 165 (1849). Here, a third party was injured
when a negligently constructed bridge collapsed. The court held that there was no connec-
tion between the wrong done and the injured person, i.e. no privity of contract. Id.at 172-73.
38. See, e.g., Fisher v. Simon, 112 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1961).
39. See, e.g., Chesser v. King, 428 S.W.2d 633 (Ark. 1968); Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Wat-
son, 154 S.E.2d 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
40. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 96-98 (4th ed. 1971).
41. See, e.g., Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 563 P.2d 976 (Colo. Ct. App.
1977); Oliver v. City Builders, 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974).
42. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
43. See, e.g., Carter v. Livesay Window Co., 73 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1954); Breeding's Dania
Drug Co. v. Runyon, 2 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1941); Calvera v. Green Springs, Inc., 220 So. 2d 414
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
44. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. Me. 1947);
Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 272 S.W.2d 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954); Fisher v. Simon, 112
N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1961). See also, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 101 (4th
ed. 1971).
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house brought action under a theory of negligence against the con-
tractor for the cost of repairing latent defects."' In analyzing the
extent of contractor liability, the court found no difference in prin-
ciple regardless of whether the contractors' negligence resulted in
personal injury or property damage.4 Similar extensions to prop-
erty damage have been made by other courts under the negligence
theory. For example, in the New Mexico case of Steinberg v. Coda
Roberson Construction Co., the remote purchaser of a house sued
the contractor under a negligence theory for the cost of repairs ne-
cessitated by an alleged defective roof.47 In holding the contractor
liable, the court recognized that the existence of privity is wholly
immaterial in a negligence action involving a contractor and a re-
mote purchaser.48 Also, in support of the modern trend, the court
noted that the question of liability should be approached from a
standard of reasonable care and that such an approach would elim-
inate the necessity of determining whether a particular condition is
inherently dangerous.49 Other jurisdictions have invoked similar
rationale in extending contractor liability to third persons.50 The
California Supreme Court in Stewart v. Cox, instituted a balancing
test in resolving the question of a contractor's liability to a remote
purchaser for property damage .5  Adhering to the rationale of
Stewart, other case holdings indicate that under the negligence
theory remote purchasers are members of a class of persons who
could reasonably be foreseen as users of the property.52
The rulings in California,5" New Mexico,5 and Wisconsin 5 typ-
ify a movement toward more consumer-oriented law in the area of
contractor liability to third persons. Most states have introduced
45. 112 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1961).
46. Id. at 709.
47. 440 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1968).
48. Id. at 799.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Stewart v. Cox, 362 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1961); Cosgriff Neon Co. v. Mattheus,
371 P.2d 819 (Nev. 1962); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 121 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1956).
51. 362 P.2d 345, 348 (Cal. 1961). This test involves the balancing of various factors,
such as foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree to which the original transaction
was intended to affect him, and the policy of preventing future harm. Id. A test of this type
suggests that public policy should play a large part in the determination of contractor
liability.
52. See, e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963); Temple Sinai-Suburban Re-
form Temple v. Richmond, 308 A.2d 508 (R.I. 1973).
53. See Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1963); Stewart v. Cox, 362 P.2d 345 (Cal.
1961).
54. See Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr. Co., 440 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1968).
55. See Fisher v. Simon, 112 N.W.2d 705 (Wis. 1961).
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recovery under the negligence theory by slowly chipping away at
the established "nonliability after acceptance" rule. Courts have
justified the imposition of liability on the contractor through a va-
riety of rationales. For instance, the court in Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc. extended application of the MacPherson doctrine by
finding a lack of meaningful distinction between the mass produc-
tion and sale of homes and that of automobiles." Meanwhile, the
opinion in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. indicated that a control-
ling factor in the extension of liability was the greater capacity of
the builder to absorb the loss.5 7
Unfortunately, Florida has avoided the progressiveness dis-
played by other states. Instead of eliminating the "nonliability af-
ter acceptance" rule in favor of a foreseeability standard, Florida
courts have elected to erode the rule's application by promulgating
exceptions. Although this process of generating new rules through
exceptions is common to our legal system, at some point the tradi-
tional rule must be abandoned by the courts in favor of a decisive
new rule. To let the process continue until the exceptions outweigh
the rule is poor judicial practice. Unfortunately, Florida today is
nearly two decades behind many other states in establishing ave-
nues of recovery for remote purchasers.
As recently as 1972, a Florida court recognized that the law deal-
ing with contractor liability was based on anachronistic distinc-
tions which make no sense in today's society.58 The court empha-
sized current concepts of morality as forming the basis of law and
the judicial need for constant vigilance to keep the commonf law
"abreast" of the times. 9 Most Florida courts, however, maintain
their allegiance to the traditional rule by declining to equate the
standard for liability of contractors with that of manufacturers in
products liability cases.60
The question of whether the modern trend will inflict an unlim-
ited amount of liability on the contractor is implicit in discussion
of the issue. Three factors argue against such a proposition. First,
by definition, a test of foreseeability and reasonable care under the
circumstances supplies parameters for determining liability. By
virtue of this test, purveyors of shoddy work will be penalized
while responsible, competent builders will avoid liability. Second,
56. 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
57. 207 A.2d 314, 323 (N.J. 1965).
58. Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
59. Id.
60. See El Shorafa v. Ruprecht, 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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the passage of time, in and of itself, will create buffers to shield the
contractor since the difficulty of producing reliable evidence in-
creases over time. In addition, contributing and intervening causal
factors, which may arise as time passes, will impede a plaintiff's
ability to litigate successfully. While at first glance, these factors
may seem to equally hinder the contractor in the structuring of his
defense, the Florida Supreme Court has specifically recognized
that "the difficulty of proof would seem to fall at least as heavily
on injured plaintiffs who must generally carry the initial burden of
establishing that the defendant was negligent."6 Last, it should be
noted that the advent of insurance has prevented the implementa-
tion of such a liability standard from impairing the livelihood of
manufacturers in the products liability area.
Hopefully, Simmons will be the last exception added to the
traditional rule "slate" in Florida. The time has arrived for the
Florida Supreme Court to wipe this slate clean by declaring un-
equivocally that the question of a contractor's liability to remote
purchasers, whether for personal injury or property damage, will
be determined according to a standard of foreseeability and rea-
sonable care under the circumstances.
JOHN S. FAGAN
61. Unfortunately, Florida builders have been denied the comfort of a statute of limita-
tions dealing with contractor liability. See Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572
(Fla. 1979). In Overland, the court held the statute of limitations dealing with contractor
liability, FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1979), unconstitutional to the extent that it absolutely
bars lawsuits commenced later than 12 years after construction. 369 So. 2d at 574.
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